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Advocates: Art and Philosophy *
Approaching the ‘Relations ’ of Philosophy and Art in the 20th Century
Introduction: Advocates 
T h e re  exist qu ite  d iffe ren t and  incom parable cases o f the  re lation betw een
* The lecture entitled  »Advocates: Art and Philosophy. Approaching the Relations of 
Philosophy and Art in the 20th Century« was given in collaboration with dancer and 
philosopher Jill Sigman. The paper that is now before you wasn’t read; I presented to 
the audience its main theses instead. During my talkjill Sigman performed an improvised 
dance. Between the dance and the speech there were some necessary and some incidental 
correspondences and reactions.
I began my talk with an introduction  that was not written down and was therefore 
‘advocating’ my relation towards presentations by other participants of the congress. 
H ere is a written reconstruction of this introduction:
W ho am I? I am no t Boris Groys, Mikhail Epstein, Komar and Melamid, or NSK 
My grandm other was a story-teller. She liked to tell private and public stories. I am a 
story-teller and am telling public stories. Her favourite story was about my grandfather 
and his schoolmates, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and, maybe, Adolf Hitler. I am not sure if 
this was a true story. She said that my grandfather and Ludwig Wittgenstein, and, maybe, 
Adolf Hitler, attended the same primary school.... Why I am tellingyou this? Why am
I returning to narrative speech?
Today, here and now, my task is to return philosophy and aesthetics to thinking and 
speaking. I have to separate them  from the ‘paper’ (text) and return them  to the 
body, thinking and voice. And I do it in the way as this was done by Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
for exam ple, o r in some o ther way, by Martin Heidegger. W ittgenstein once said 
»Philosophy is hell to me!« And just now, in front of you and for you too, to think and 
speak in English about ‘advocating’ between art and philosophy is hell for me too; I 
show you my hell. The hell o f my thoughts and my mind. My task is to return voice and 
thought to philosophy, to return  the body to it.
O ur task was to return voice and body to philosophy, wasn’t it, Jill? This was Jill Sigman, 
the dancer and philosopher. I thank her for her endless assistance. Thanks to all of 
you!
And this was the introduction. Later, someone from the audience asked why I returned 
to family stories and why was I telling the story? One possible answer would be that because 
this is the way of building history and tradition -  these are the mechanisms in which 
postsocialist cultures build a phantasm  of their own reality. I come from such a world 
(from the world of dram atic and tragic postsocialism) and reveal to you the relation of 
the voice to the body. Then another person noticed that the body of dance and voice 
of the lecture were in contradiction, that they took the focus away, be it from dance or 
voice (the spoken word). I hope my answer was clear, that the relation between the
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a r t  an d  p h ilo so p h y , a n d  it is th e re fo re ,  a c c o rd in g  to  M o rris  W e itz ,1 
unnecessary to give generalizations o f  a certa in  re la tio n  betw een  a r t  an d  
philosophy in order to explain some o th e r relations which are qu ite  d ifferen t 
and  incom parable. I shall designate these d iffe ren t re la tions with the  vague 
term  ‘advocating’ which can, am ong o th e r things, designate the  following:
(i) T he use of a rt in philosophy o r th e  use o f p h ilo sophy  in  a r t  in  the  
m an n er in which ph ilosopher Ludwig W ittgenstein  a rgued  th a t »the 
m ean ing  o f a word is its use in the  language.«2 Sim ilarly the  p a in te r 
M arcel D ucham p claim ed that by the  ready-m ade he  called the  choice 
and  the nam ing o f an ord inary  a n d  m u n d an e  ob ject an  artw ork .3
(ii) T he claim, closely re la ted  to tha t o f  p h ilo so p h er Louis A lthusser, tha t 
p h ilo so p h y  d o e s n ’t possess its p ro p e r  o b je c t o f  c o g n itio n , b u t  is 
constitu ted  instead as the subject o f  the  desire, as a realm  o f  com bat, 
dom ination  and  intervention. I t th e re fo re  does n o t exist as a dom ain  
of knowledge, b u t is, instead, an  advocate o f politics in the dom ain  o f 
science, separating the im aginary from  the scientific, etc.
(iii) Iden tifica tion , desc rip tion , an d  ex p lan a tio n  o f  ‘activity’ in s tead  o f 
po in ting  to the ontological disciplinary essence. T hus the p o e t Charles 
Bernstein claimed: »Another traditional distinction betw een philosophy 
and  poetry now sounds anachronistic: th a t ph ilosophy is involved with 
system -building an d  consistency a n d  p o etry  w ith th e  b eau ty  o f  th e  
lan g u ag e  a n d  em o tio n . A part from  th e  g ro te sq u e  d u alism  o f  this 
d is tin c tio n  (as if consistency a n d  th e  q u es t fo r ce rta in ty  w ere  n o t  
em otional!), this view im agines poetry  and  philosophy  to be  d efin ed  
by the product o f their activity, consistent texts in the one case, beautiful 
texts in  the o ther. R ather, ph ilosophy an d  poetry  are  a t least equally 
definable no t as the p roduct o f philosophizing and  poetic thinking, but, 
in d e e d , as th e  p rocess (o r activ ity) o f  p h ilo s o p h iz in g  o r  p o e tic  
thinking.«4
(iv) It could designatejacques Lacan’s definition o f signifiers: »The signifier 
is som ething that represents a subject for an o th e r signifier,« or: »For 
one signifier every o th er signifier can  re p re sen t a subject,« or: »O ne
body and the voice was external to the effect o f the ‘paper’ (text) and that I worked 
with difficulties in concentration -  with confrontation am ong thought, voice and body.
' Cf. Morris Weitz, »The Role of Theory in Aesthetics«, in J. Margolis (ed.), Philosophy 
Looks at the Arts (Philadelphia: Tem ple University Press, 1987), pp. 150-153.
2 Ludwig W ittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), § 43.
3 M ichel Sanouillet, Elmer Peterson (eds), The Essential Writings o f Marcel Duchamp 
(London: Thames and H udson, 1975), pp. 32,141-142.
4 Charles Bernstein, »Writing and Method«, in Content’s Dream. Essays 1975-1984 (Los 
Angeles: Sun&Moon Press, 1986), p. 218.
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signifier rep resen ts  a subject for all o th er signifiers.«5 In o th er words, 
‘an  artwork is som ething that represents a subject for all o ther artworks’; 
‘an  artw o rk  re p re se n ts  su b jec t fo r p h ilo so p h ica l d isco u rse ’; o r ‘a 
ph ilosoph ical d iscourse represents a subject for all artw orks’; or:
(v) T o p o in t to the  re la tio n  betw een art and philosophy resem bles the 
situation  o f a legal p roceed ing  (trial) in which ‘advocates’ speak in the 
n am e o f the accused as well as the victim , b u t also in the nam e o f the 
m eta tex t w hich is rep resen ted  by the ‘p eo p le ’, the ‘sovereign’, ‘G o d ’, 
‘universal ju s tic e ’ o r  ‘t ru th ’.6
Such op tions are b u t a p repara tion  for approach ing  the exam ples of 
‘advocating’ a rt and  o f advocating ‘philosophy’.
An-Artwork Precedes the Discourse of Philosophy
It is o ften  c laim ed  th a t an  artw ork precedes the theo re tica l (ph ilo ­
sophical) discourse. T h e  starting  p o in t is the  belief th a t an artw ork is an 
expression o r an  effect o f  an  individual, intuitive and original artistic act of 
creating. A rt em erges from  the ‘opaqueness’ o f artist’s intuitions. T he painter 
Jackson Pollock said tha t an artist creates as nature does. According to Charles 
H arrison , »In this voice, the  individual artist is ce lebrated  for tha t wilful 
ex tension  o f cu ltura l an d  psychological boundaries which he  (or very rarely 
she) achieves in  p u rsu it o f  newness o f effect. Thus, for, exam ple, the work 
o f the A m erican  ‘First G en e ra tio n ’ painters, and  particularly o f  Pollock, is 
a sso c ia te d  w ith  th e  l ib e ra t io n  a n d  p u rif ic a tio n  o f  a r t ’s re so u rce s  o f 
expression, and  with the possibility o f a g reater spontaneity  and im mediacy 
in pain ting.«7 In this m odel an  artwork is described as being  similar to nature 
(a n a tu ra l object, situation , o r event). An artw ork is thus ex ternal to the 
theo re tical o r ph ilosophical discourse.
Philosophy (theory) (a) nam es; (b) describes and  translates from  non- 
discursive in to  the  discursive; (c) explains the intentions, the  concept, or an 
artw ork in relation to an o th er discourse; (d) mediates in the com m unication 
w ithin cu ltu ra l fram eworks; an d  (e) in terprets what can n o t be enuncia ted  
o f the artistic the ‘sensual’, ‘m ateria l’ or ‘vital’, h ighlighting what can be said 
and  en u n c ia ted  in philosophy. T he philosophical or theoretical discourse 
appears as an  excess o f m ean ing , sense and value in re lation to an artwork.
5 Jacques Lacan, Ecrits (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1966), p. 819.
6 Names such as Barthes, Lacan, D errida, W ittgenstein, Rorty spring to mind.
7 Charles Harrison, »A Kind o f Context«, in Essays on Art&Language (Oxford: Blackwell,
1991), pp. 4-5.
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At the sam e time the ontology o f the w ork (o f the  art) an d  the  on tology o f 
the discourse (o f philosophy) are two d iffe ren t an d  in com parab le  ‘worlds 
o f ex istence’ which can only partially be  b ro u g h t in to  a ce rta in  descriptive, 
exp lana to ry  and  in te rp re ta tiv e  c o r re sp o n d e n c e  w ith th e  aid  o f  a th ird  
m etadiscourse, th a t o f philosophy on  philosophy  an d  on  art.
A n Artwork and the Public Metatext o f Culture
An artw ork exists in re la tion  to the  public  m e ta tex t o f  cu ltu re . T h e  
starting thesis is tha t an artw ork is a h u m an  an d  social p ro d u c t w hich, by 
this very fact, engenders and  carries specific (d ifferential) m eanings. T hese 
m eanings a re  no t som ething o rig inating  in the artis t o r in the  o b jec t th a t 
h e /s h e  m ade or in the ‘m irro r n a tu re ’ o f  the ob ject in re la tion  to the  world, 
b u t orig inating  in the necessity th a t w hat an  artist has m ade is in  a ce rta in  
‘in tertex tual re la tion ’ with cultural m eta tex t(s) .8 In o th e r  words, a p a in tin g  
by Caravaggio o r Kandinsky does n o t re p re sen t the  w orld, i. e. a m usical 
com position by Haydn or S choenberg  does n o t express the  h u m an  sp irit or 
em otions because it resem bles ‘the w orld ’ o r ‘sp irit’, b u t because it is in an  
in tertexual interpretative relation with the public m eta tex t o f  an  ep o ch  o r a 
civilization0 or in relation to p articu lar texts o f  a ce rta in  cu ltu re , an  art, a 
ph ilosophy, politics, a re lig ion , o r even, ‘private lan g u ag es’ th a t a fte r a 
certain tim e enter into the dom ain o f cultural ‘public language’. T he relation 
betw een a cultural m etatex t and  a particu la r artw ork in 20 th-C entury  a r t is 
often n o t a stable and  invariant one; one  th a t w ould be legalized by a social 
con tract. I t rests, on  the contrary , o n  a case-to-case basis an d  is o p en  to 
transform ations (to the ‘p ene tra tion  o f  the signifier in to  the  sign ified ’).
The Artworld
Art is n o t only an artwork, b u t an  ‘a rtw orld ’. In the  m id-sixties A rth u r 
D anto expressed a characteristic thesis ab o u t the ‘tran sc en d en t’ n a tu re  o f 
art. H e wrote: »To see som ething as a rt requ ires so m eth in g  the  eye c a n n o t 
decry - an  atm osphere o f artistic theory, a know ledge o f the  history o f  art:
8 Jean-François Groulier, »Reading the Visible«, Art Press, no. 177 (Paris, 1993), pp. E l 5- 
E17; Louis Marin, »Questions, Hypotheses, Discourse«, in To Destroy Painting (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 15-29.
9 In European tradition such a text is the Testam ent; in countries o f »real socialism« 
such a text was Marx’s or Lenin’s.
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an artw orld .«10 In  o th e r  words, art is n o t an  object (a painting, a sculpture, 
a  b u ild in g )  o r  a s itu a tio n  (an  en v iro n m en t, a scenic a r ran g em en t, an 
in s ta lla tio n ), o r  an  event (a musical artwork, a cinem a projection, a d an ce ), 
b u t a constitu tive re la tion  o f an  ‘artw orld’ in which the  very object, event, 
o r s ituation  appears as an  artwork: »The world has to be ready for certain 
things, the artw orld no  less than  the real one. It is the role o f artistic theories, 
these days as always, to m ake the artw orld, and  art, possible. It would, I 
sh o u ld  th ink, never have occu rred  to the painters of Lascaux that they were 
p roduc ing  art on those walls. N ot unless there were Neolithic aestheticians.«1' 
Such an  ap p ro ach  cou ld  be designated as ‘tran scen d en t’ for it implies an 
‘o n to lo g ica l’ p resence o f an  artw ork as such by tha t w hich is n o t in artwork 
itself, a lth o u g h  it is ‘crucially overdeterm in ing’ it. H ence an African mask 
in  th e  B ritish  M useum , D u c h a m p ’s snow-shovel o r  a p o rce la in  u rin a l 
exh ib ited  in the G eorges Pom pidou C entre o r whichever painting  by H enri 
M attisse do  n o t share com m on m orphological characteristics which would 
constitu te  them  as artworks: a m ask belongs to the ‘w orld’ o f ritual, a shovel 
was m ade as a u tilitarian  ob ject (as a tool for rem oving snow ), and M attisse’s 
p a in tin g  was m ade as an  artw ork (as a pain ting  apperta in ing  to the realm  
o f  pa in tin g ).
All these cases are iden tified  as ‘artw orks’ only in th a t historical world 
w hich offers a specific (n o t any o th er) theory  o f the ‘artw orld ’ and  the 
‘artw ork ’: a theory  o f existing (ontology), a theory o f looking (reception), 
a  theory  o f creation  (poetics), a theory o f in terp re ta tion  (philosophy) and 
a theory  o f  use (the use is a ‘p ractical’ phenom enal in te rp re ta tio n  o f the 
re la tion  betw een an object, art, and  philosophy). This con tinuum  does no t 
exist in o th e r historical o r  geographical ‘cu ltu res’, b u t only in the culture of 
W este rn  h eg em o n ic  m o d e rn  a r t in re la tion  to re lig ion , magic, politics, 
u tilitarian  function , etc. A rth u r D anto therefore identifies his ‘ontological 
a r t’ by the following words: »My view, philosophically, is th a t in terpretations 
co n stitu te  works o f  art, so th a t you do not, as it were, have the artwork, on 
o n e  h an d , an d  on  the in te rp re ta tio n  on the o ther.«12
Transgression, Art, and Philosophy
A v an t-g a rd e  tra n sg re ss io n s  in  a r t  a re  ‘d e v ia tio n s ’ (subversions,
10 A rthur Danto, »The Artworld«, in J. Margolis (ed .), Philosophy Looks at the Arts, p. 162.
11 Ibid, p. 164.
12 A rthu r C. D anto, The Philosophical Disenfranchisement o f Art (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986), p. 23.
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violations, disruptions, transitions, innovations, experim en ts , revolutions) 
in relation to the dom inan t hegem onic h ierarch ical pow er in art, aesthetics, 
culture, and  society. In avant-garde art in the late 19th and  early 20th century  
the avant-garde transgressions signified:
(i) a critique (subversion) o f the d o m in an t (m ainstream ) institu tions o f 
the aesthetic (of the values of the sensual and  o f recep tio n ), o f the artistic 
(of the creation o f an artw ork), o f  the existential (o f form s o f behavior, 
and  the function o f art in a specific historical society an d  c u ltu re ) , and  
o f the  political (o f the m odel o f carrying o u t o f the  social ideology as a 
pow er structu re); and
(ii) a pro jection  o f the ‘new ’ as a d o m in an t characteristic  o f  th e  p re sen t 
(m odernity) o r  the fu ture (the u to p ia  o f the o p tim um  p ro jec tio n ) .13 
T he avant-garde transgression is th ere fo re  the ‘avan t’ o f  the  d o m in an t
m o d e rn is t  c u ltu re  a n d , s im u lta n e o u s ly , its im m a n e n t  c r it ic  a n d  its 
transgression in the nam e o f the ‘new ’ o r ‘d iffe ren t’.
T he philosophy o f ‘transgression’ was an tic ip a ted  by G eorges Bataille 
who p o in ted  to the two characteristic  transgressions o f  th e  d iscourse  o f  
reason. T h e  first transgression in troduces lower e lem en ts  (a cry, a howl, 
silence, failures). T he second one po in ts to the h ig h e r elem ents (provokes 
a sym bolic co d e  from  w ith in , p ro b le m a tiz in g  th e  g u a ra n te e s  a n d  th e  
legitim ations o f sense).
By opposing these two transgressions Bataille provoked an d  questioned  
the ‘gap ’ (hiatus) between the high and  the low. Jacques D errida ,14 following 
Jacques Lacan,15 suggests that transgression o f the  d iscourse ru les im plies 
transgression o f the general Law. A ccording to Battaile, transgression is an  
‘in n e r  e x p e r ie n c e ’ in  w hich an  in d iv id u a l o r, in  th e  case o f  r itu a liz ed  
transgressions such as com m unal celebrations, the  com m unity  transgresses 
the borders of rational, m undane behavior governed  by profit, p ro d u c tio n  
and self-preservation. In transgression the power o f  the taboo manifests itself.
T ransgression employs the pow er o f the  fo rb id d en  (o f ‘crazy Law’). A 
post-Batillean defin ition  o f transgression includes:
(a) subversion, disruption, ru p tu re  and  revolution - literally, o f subversion, 
d isruption , ru p tu re , and  revolution in  an  individual existence;
(b) a parody o f transgression for, accord ing  to  M arcelin  Pleynet, »in o u r 
tim e, th ere  is no  m ore transgression, n o  m o re  subversion, n o  m o re
13 Cf. A leksandar Fiaker, ‘O ptim alna pro jekcija’, in Poetika osporavanja. Avangarda i 
književna levica (Zagreb: Kultura, 1984), pp. 62-72.
14 Cf. Jacques Derrida, »De l’économie restreinte a l’économ ie générale«, in Ecriture et la 
différence (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1967), pp. 373-384.
15 Cf. Slavoj Žižek, Filozofija skozi psihoanalizo (Ljubljana: Analecta, 1984), p. 18.
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ru p tu re ,«  only  »a p arody  o f transgression , a parody  o f subversion, 
sim ulacrum , a rep e titio n  o f rup tu re ;« 10
(c) th e  absence o f  the  m eaning;
(d) m atte r devoid o f m etaphysics (bas matérialisme);
(e) ecstasy an d  anarchy;
(f) in terven tion  o f the body in the text (écriture corporelle);
(g) a  theory  o f the n eed  fo r a deficit o r a loss, b u t n o t a theory o f a deficit 
o r  a loss;
(h) slid ing  (glissement);
(i) the  fear o f the sublim e;
(j) horizon ta l vs. vertical;
(k) en tropy  vs. creation  an d  production;
(1) the  lack o f  the sourceless and  homelessness;
(m) arch itec tu re  against architecture;
(n) eroticism ;
(o) opposition  betw een perversion and normality,
(p) functions o f  in terpretation  and the ‘blind spots’ that every interpretation 
reveals;
(q) form lesnesss (inform , formless);
(r) transparency;
(s) an  o pen  work;
(t) traum a;
(u) en tran ce  in to  a project;
(v) transgression o f  bodily dim ensions;
(w) p rom ised  e lim ination  o f symbols, m etaphors, an d  allegories, and 
(x) en tro p y  o f the  sense .17
A rt an d  p h ilo so p h y  a re  thus n e ith e r  two sep a ra te  worlds n o r  two 
c o m p le m e n ta ry  o n es . T h ey  a re  in s tead  a rea lm  o f  a rb itra r in e ss  an d  
tran sg ressio n  in  re la tio n  to  w hat em erges as the Law o f art, o r Law o f 
philosophy, o r  Law in re la tion  to art and  philosophy.
Representation o f Art in Philosophy
An indicative case is th a t o f H eidegger, fo r he with the philosophical 
discourse, w hich is a p ic tu re  (mimesis) o f ‘th ink ing’, points to art. T he art
10 M arcelin Pleynet, »Les problèm es de l’avant-garde«, Tel Quel, no. 25, Paris 1966, p. 82.
17 Cf. Yves-Alain Bois, Rosalind Kraus (eds.), L ’informe. Mode d ’emploi (Paris: Centre Georges 
Pom pidou, 1996), p. 7.
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that H eidegger speaks ab o u t is n e ith e r concre te  h istorical art, n o r  an  ideal 
(ideal figure) of the desired  art. H e speaks ab o u t a rt fo r ph ilo so p h y ’s sake. 
It is art that is represented by philosophy within the language invented  within 
philosophy, and which consists o f th e  traces o f  ph ilo soph ical m etaphysics. 
N ot w ithout reason, H eidegger writes: »W hat is art should  be in ferrab le from  
the work. W hat the work o f art is we can com e to know  only from  the essence 
o f art. A nyone can easily see tha t we are m oving in  a circle.«18
Or: »W hat hap p en s here? W hat is a t w ork in  th e  work? V an G o g h ’s 
pain ting  is the disclosure o f  what the eq u ip m en t, the  pair o f  p easan t shoes, 
is in truth. This being em erges into the unconcealedness o f its B eing.19 H ere , 
the pair o f  shoes pain ted  by Van G ogh’s h an d  is n o t in  question . N e ith e r is 
the fact tha t these are n o t the fa rm er’s shoes, b u t those o f the  artist o r o f  the 
artist’s frien d .20 T he real shoes in the  real artw ork are in question . A nd a 
‘real artw ork’ is n o ta n  historical concrete  art, b u t the  fictional (theoretically  
form ed) artwork with the help  o f which philosophy for its own purposes (i.e. 
for the purpose o f philosophical tru th  o r  speech  ab o u t ph ilosoph ical tru th  
of art) projects the artwork which m ediates for philosophy, o r  ph ilosophical 
q u e s tio n in g  the  w ariness o r even h o r ro r  o f  th e  ‘b ase le ss’ n a tu re  a n d  
‘hom elessness’ o fW estern  thought.
Discourse of the Artists: From Van Gogh to Malevich
Let m e consider a specific story ab o u t theory  an d  art, fo r exam ple, th a t 
told by Lawrence Alloway.21 W ritings by artists cou ld  be traced  in  th e  past 
up  to the 15th century examples such as G hilberti’s Commentaries o r  A lberti’s 
Treatise on Art. The first interview comes from th e l6 th  century w hen B rendetto  
Varchi questioned  artists (M ichelangelo, B ronzino ). In the 17th cen tu ry  
artist’s co rrespondence (Rubens, Poussin) and  a rtis t’s books (C harles Le 
Brun) appeared. A polem ic between writers (D iderot) and  artists (Falconeti) 
is well know n. In the 19th century artists w rote le tters (Pissarro, Van G o g h ), 
traveler-diaries o r m em oires (H unt, G auguin). W ritings from  the  late 19th 
century are ne ith e r technical treatises, n o r tractates, b u t a d iscourse in  the 
first person  by the artist abou t him self, a r t an d  the  world.
18 Martin Heidegger, »The Origin of the W ork o f  Art«, in Basic Writings (San Francisco: 
H arper, 1977), p. 149.
19 Ibid., p. 164.
2(1 Cf. Meyer Shapiro, Selected Papers. Theory and Philosophy of Art: Style, Artist, and Society, 
vol. 4 (New York: George Braziller, 1994), pp. 138-139.
21 Lawrence Alloway, »Artists as Writers, 1: Inside Inform ation«, in Network. Art and the 
Complex Present (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1984), p. 208.
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W hat does this little story tell us? It points to specific changes in the 
status o f  th e  a r tis t a n d  his id en tity  from  the  M iddle Ages th ro u g h  the  
R enaissance to the m o d ern  age and  m odernism . Speaking schematically we 
cou ld  say th a t an  a rtis t in the M iddle Ages was p lunged  in to  a C hristian 
to ta liz ing  m eta lan g u ag e , a legitim izing m etalanguage w hich o ffered  an 
u n spoken  an d  self-understandable continuum  between the world, the artist, 
and  the artwork. T he ab andonm en t in which the m odern  artist finds him self/ 
herself, an  artist who is no  longer plunged into the great unifying-homogenous 
m etalanguage o f the world, the society, and the power o f  religious totalizing 
tran scen d en ce , forces h im /h e r  to identify an d  advocate h im self/herself. 
M ichel Faucault w rote th a t the subject is a historical p h en o m en o n .22 T he 
‘artist’ is theoretically anticipated  in the 19th century private writings (letters, 
d iaries, co rresp o n d en ce , jo u rn a ls) o f various artists. In  the  20th century  it 
is fo rm u la ted  as a pas tout m etalanguage for specific use. (This use can  be 
personal, as in  an  a rtis t’s poetics; specific, as in pedagogy; or specialist, as 
in ph ilosophy  o f a r t) .
W hat, then , does ‘theory  o f the artist’ m ean if we are aware that:
(i) th e  id ea  o f  th eo ry  o f  th e  artis t ap p ea red  in  a ce rta in  epoch  o f a r t 
(pain ting , scu lp tu re), an d  in a certain  epoch  of discourse (the way in 
w hich a th o u g h t was expressed, the way o f p roducing  a text);
(ii) the theory o f the artist is though t o f and expressed as an  idea, a concept, 
an d  a p ro ject in discourse which structurally and axiologically included 
ce rta in  re la tions betw een speech (and writing) and  the appearance o f 
an  a r t ob ject (object, situation, event);
(iii) the  theory  o f the  artist is n o t ju s t a secondary tool in the process o f 
c rea tin g  o r p ro d u c in g  an  object, a situation, o r an  event (artw ork), 
instead  it is, prim arily, in the service o f establishing and  m aking work 
an artw ork, an  artw orld, an d  an a rt history.
I will now  p o in t to the difference between the stage of discourse in the 
tim e  w h en  V in c e n t van  G ogh  w ro te  le tte rs  to  his b ro th e r ,23 a n d  th e  
sup rem atist ‘ph ilosophy’ o f Kasimir Malevich.24 T he letters are the ‘sp eech ’ 
o f  th e  m o d ern  subject who is constitu ted  as a hypothetically au tonom ous 
‘S elf in the dom ain o f the necessity of identification of intuition, o f the private 
n a tu re  o f his ex istence an d  auto-poetic spelling o f ‘the tru th  in p a in tin g ’. 
Van G ogh becom es ‘van G ogh’ through parallelism of his practice, existence
22 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Science (New York: 
R andom  House, 1970).
23 Cf. Ronald De Leeuw (ed.), The Letters of Vincent Van Gogh (New York: Penguin, 1996).
24 Cf. T. A nderson (ed.), Malevich: Essays on Art 1915-1933 (Chewster Springs: Rapp and 
W hiting; London: D ufour Editions, 1969).
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and  thinking. In M alevich’s case the situation  is ra th e r d ifferen t. H e works 
u n d er the circum stances o f asocial revolution (first the bourgeois an d  th en  
the Bolshevik), o f decentred  eclectic m odernism  and  at a tim e o f em ergence 
o f p a r tic u la r  d iscourses: th a t  o f  th e  B olshevik  re v o lu tio n , o f  l i te ra ry  
theoretical formalism, of allegorical theosophy, and  the d iscourse o f  a self- 
observ ing  au to n o m o u s m o d ern is t p a in te r . In  p a in tin g s  su ch  as »Black 
Square« (1913-15?) an d  »W hite o n  W hite« (1917-18) th e  fu n d a m e n ta l 
practical (poetical) questions o f suprem atism  are solved.25
D uring the twenties Malevich posits theoretical questions which finally 
drove him  o u t of art altogether, towards m ediating the ‘idea o f  suprem atism ’ 
in re lation to philosophy.
His questions were:
(i) the question o f the science o f pain ting  (o f a theory  o f  the ‘add itional 
e lem en t’);
(ii) that o f  an  artistic education; an d
(iii) the question o f the possible ‘suprem atist w orld ’; pain ting , scu lp tu re , 
arch itecture and  applied  arts th a t ap p eared  in  the twenties, are n o t a rt 
in its creative literal sense, b u t an  a ttem p t to show th a t the  pain ting , 
sculpture, a rch itectu re  an d  app lied  arts advocate th e  ph ilo sophy  o f 
suprem atist world.
The Troubles with Wittgenstein’s Philosophy
It is paradoxical tha t the g reat p h ilo so p h er, w ho believed solved all 
p h ilo so p h ica l secrets and  p a rad o x es  (in  Tractatus), is today  re a d  a n d  
in te rp re ted  in  the artw orld and  in the  synchronically theo re tica l w orlds (in 
criticism, aesthetics, philosophy o f art) as a parad igm atic  m odel o f w riting 
(écriture) in art.20 It is this exam ple tha t I will discuss here . W ittg en ste in ’s 
books Tractatus (1922) and  Philosophische Untersuchungen (1953) a re  n o t 
w ritten as poetical studies, books on  the  aesthetics o r ph ilosophy o f  art. O n 
the  con trary , they are w ritten  as books a b o u t th e  u ltim a te  q u estio n s o f 
philosophy, o f philosophy which is akin to scientific th ink ing  (th a t o f  the 
natural o r form al sciences). But since D ada an d  Fluxus, i.e. from  the  en d  o f 
the fifties (cf. notes by the pain ter Jasp er Jo h n s, ideas by the com poser J o h n
25 »By suprematism I understand suprem ation of pure  feeling in visual art« -  Kasimir 
Malewitsch, Die Gegenstandslose Welt (Berlin: Florian Kupferberg, 1980), p. 65.
20 Cf., for example, Marjorie Perloff, Wittgenstein's Ladder (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996);Jorn K. Bramann, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and the Modem Arts (Rochester: 
Adler Publishing Company, 1985).
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Cage) th ro u g h  m inim al and  conceptual art o f the sixties (cf. works by the 
p a in te r  M el B o ch n er, c h o re o g ra p h e r  Yvonne R ainer, con cep tu a l artist 
Jo se p h  K o su th  a n d  th e  g ro u p  A rt& L an g u ag e  o r  th e  g ro u p  K od) to 
p o stm o d ern  strategies o f the seventies, eighties and  nineties (cf. poetry and 
theo ry  o f  th e  A m erican  m ovem ent ‘l=a=n=g=u=a=ge poetry ’, film experi­
m en ts  by D e rek  J a rm a n , ‘deco n stru c tiv is t’ p rose  by Kathy A cker), his 
ph ilosophy is read  in a qu ite  d ifferen t way. It could be said tha t this way is 
an  a sy m m etric a l o n e  in  re la t io n  to  th e  p h ilo so p h y  u n d e rs to o d  as a 
ph ilosophy  o f science.
L et m e offer som e exam ples. Jasper Jo h n s destroyed the critique of 
the m odern ist G reenberg ian  autonom ous pictorial painterly plane (ranging 
from  abstract expressionism  to postpainterly  abstraction) by in troducing  
n o n aesth e tic  concep tual relations between the words and  the pain ting  (i.e. 
p a in tin g  »Fool’s H ouse«, 1962), m odelling  this p ro ced u re  after W ittgen­
s te in ’s discussion o f  the  use o f  the word in his Philosophical Investigations. 
T h e  in stru m en ta l pow er o f taste (o f Kantian ju d g em en t based on taste) is 
dram atically  co n fro n ted  with the critical powers o f conceptual analyses o f 
pain ting  an d  o f conceptualization of the m anual-pictoral analysis o f painting.
W ith in  the  co n tex t o f conceptual art Joseph  Kosuth based the idea of 
w orking w ithin a rt as a form  o f  theoretical investigation o f ‘p ropositions’ 
o n  th e  ana log ies w ith W ittg en ste in ’s investigations o f  ‘p ro p o sitio n s’ in 
p h ilo s o p h y .27 H e  saw h is  ow n a r tis tic  w ork  as an  a r t  a p p ro p r ia t in g  
ph ilo soph ical com petences, as ‘a rt after ph ilosophy’. A rt is thus defined 
thanks to  the  m ediation  o f the language ‘art gam es’ which represents away 
o f critical self-reflective h ea lin g  o f a rt from  the illusions and  illnesses o f 
a e s th e tic s  as a p h ilo so p h y  o f  taste. T he c o n fro n ta tio n  o f th eo ry  (i.e. 
W ittgenste in ’s philosophy) and  art does n o t lead towards an understand ing  
o f an  a rt work as a cen tra l e lem en t o f art, bu t to art as an  activity o r explicitly 
as a p ractice o f a specific conceptualization o f the function of an  artw ork as 
the p ro d u c t and  o f a r t as a con tex t o f such a production .
I w ould  like to  b eg in  my discussion o f the status o f W ittgenste in ’s 
p h ilo so p h y  w ith in  th e  in te rp re ta tiv e  fram es o f a r t  by re m a rk in g  th a t 
W ittgenstein  does n o t offer a slogan or a statem ent which would support 
the beliefs (taste, in ten tio n s) o f  an artist or a theoretic ian  o f art, i.e. that he 
does n o t speak ab o u t a r t o r artistic a t all. But w hat is it, th a t W ittgenstein’s 
ph ilosophical writings do? It dem onstrates how a self-reflective observation, 
analysis, discussion an d  p roduc tion  o f a system o f the ‘language o f a r t’ are 
possible an d  how it is possible to rep resen t a rt in a discursive m an n er for
27 Cf. Joseph Kosuth, »Art after Philosophy«, Art after Philosophy and After. Collected Writings, 
1966-1990 (Cam bridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 13-32.
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art in re la tion  to philosophy and  theory. In o th e r  w ords, how  philosophy  
advocates philosophy for philosophy.
W hat W ittgenstein’s philosophical writings offer a rt is an open  analogy: 
how to observe, analyse, discuss, and  p ro d u ce , from  w ithin  art, a system o f 
an ‘art language’, i.e. how can art be discursively advocated in the nam e o f 
art and in relation to philosophy and  theory. This is the basis on  w hich artists 
from  the late fifties on  raised the question  o f philosophy, b u t n o t w ith in  the 
philosophy that speaks o f art, b u t in art (painting, music, dance, poetry, film) 
itself and  there in  started  to em ploy the languages o f a r t to  speak a b o u t the 
n a tu re  o f  th e ir  w ork (o f  th e  su b je c t in  th e  p ro c e s s ) . W it tg e n s te in ’s 
philosophical work was a prom ise o f such a parad igm atic  approach : n o t to 
philosophize abou t philosophy, b u t to ask onese lf and  to d em o n stra te  o n e ’s 
question ing  by em ploying a special active language used  by the speaking, 
writing, pain ting , sculpting, singing, playing, o r  d an c in g  subject, i.e. an d  
hence advocates for o th er ‘texts’ o f  cu ltu re  an d  history.
From an Inquiry into Music to the Theory at Work
A rn o ld  S ch o en b e rg  ca rr ie d  o u t  an  e x tra o rd in a ry  re v o lu tio n : h e  
questioned  the tonal system and  offered  a creative an d  theo re tica l answ er 
to it with th e  idea  o f a tonal m usic. W hat I am  in te re s te d  in  h e re  is th e  
in tertex tual re la tion  o f his discussion o f m usic with his com posing . This 
relation  is n o t a philosophical one and  d irec ted  against aesthetics as it was 
understood  a t the end  o f the 19th an d  in the  b eg inn ing  o f  the 20th  century: 
»If I sh o u ld  succeed  in teach in g  th e  p u p il th e  h a n d ic ra f t o f  o u r  a r t  as 
com pletely as a carpen ter can teach his, th en  I shall be satisfied. A nd I would 
be p ro u d  if, to ad o p t a fam iliar saying, I co u ld  say: ‘I have taken from  
com position pupils a bad aesthetics an d  have given them  in re tu rn  a good  
course in handicraft’.«29 Carl D ahlhaus29 th o u g h t th a t S cho en b erg  d iscarded  
the m etaphysical discourse o f musical beauty  as unnecessary, an d  o ffered  a 
quite d ifferent discourse on music: a discourse o f pedagogy, th a t o f a musical 
theore tic ian , a discourse o f musicology, o f  a com poser and , o f  course, a 
d isco u rse  o f  advocating  a co n c ep tu a liz a tio n  o f  th e  m e tam o rp h o s is  (a 
deconstruction) of tonal into atonal music. However, S choenberg  is a real 
modernist for his theory is an autonom ous ‘system’ o f articulation o f a discursive
28 Cf. Arnold Schoenberg, Theory of Harmony (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 
1983), p. 12.
29 Karl Dahlhaus, Estetika muzike (Musikästhetik) (Novi Sad: Kniževna zajednica Novog Sada,
1992), p. 5.
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sense  w hich  follows a f te r  th e  creative m usical act an d  is ex te rio r to it. 
Schoenberg’s work is autonom ous in relation to his discourse, and his discourse 
is a discussion o f music exterior to music itself, an almost scientific discourse.
In  Jo h n  C age’s m usic30 the process is quite d ifferen t from  the forties 
un til the  n ineties, fo r th e re in  we see theory at work. His work leads Cage 
outside o f music. Music hence  develops as an ‘ex tended  activity’ which can 
exist in an  in te rtex tu a l re la tion  with music o f the O th er, of o th er arts or 
discursive form s o f expression and  representation .
W hat is c reated  as a theoretical discourse could be described as:
(a) ‘M etam usic’ - Cage speaks o f a fundam ental transform ation o f musical 
o n to lo g y  ( in te n tio n a l ex p ressio n  w ith sou n d s) in to  a th eo re tic a l 
d iscourse  on  m usic w hich is realized in  the location  and  u n d er the 
circum stances in w hich the perform ance o f a musical work is expected 
(the in ten tional creation o f sounds). It appears as if the music advocates 
a certain  ‘philosophy’ o r ‘theory’ within the context of music in relation 
to  the philosophical and  theoretical discourse th a t is ex terior to it.
(b) ‘L ec tu re  p o e try ’ - C age speaks o f the  d isp lacem en t from  one  a r t 
d iscip line (m usic) in to  an o th e r (poetry). This poetry  is n o t ju s t any 
poetry  b u t th a t o f the avant-garde sort, in which the  poetic (expressive) 
ch a rac te r o f  the d iscourse is confron ted  with fragm ents or traces o f 
m e ta la n g u a g e  o n  a r t ,  p o litic s , e x is te n c e , re lig io n , a n d  tex tu a l 
p roduc tion .
(c) ‘T extual p ro d u c tio n ’ is the p roduction  of a text w hich is ne ither music 
n o r  poetry , b u t ‘tex tua l productiv ity’ in art. T o claim  th a t a text is 
p ro d u c tiv ity  (le t us ap p ro ach  this d efin itio n  gradually , first from  
outside, th rough  its norm ative aspect) means that textual letter (écriture) 
presupposes, as its tactic, the defeat o f the descriptive o rien ta tion  o f 
language and  the em ergence o f a device tha t creates conditions for a 
full developm ent o f its generative capability.31 In o th er words, a certain 
text o f  a rt advocates m usic for o th e r texts o f  m usic, o th er arts (poetry, 
lite ra tu re ), theories o f a r t and culture, philosophy, etc.
And yet ano ther difference! Schoenberg builds his autonom ous m etatext 
o n  m u sic  w h ich  h as a re la tiv e ly  c o n s is te n t s tru c tu re  o f  d e sc rip tio n , 
explanation, and  in terpretation . The ‘discourse o f a com poser’ is constituted 
in the  in terspace  o f a d ifferen tia ting  discourse o f m usic, musicology and
30 On Cage see, for exam ple, M arjorie Perloff, Charles Junkerm an (eds.), John Cage. 
Composed in America (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994); John Cage, Silence 
(Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1967).
31 François W ahl, »Autour d ’une critique du signe«, in O. Ducrot & T. Todorov (eds.), 
Dictionnaire encyclopédique des sciences du langage (Paris: Seuil, 1972), pp. 445-446.
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philosophy. Cage, on the contrary, p resen ts the  productivity  o f  the tex t as 
an open  eclectic in tertex tual relation  betw een:
(a) a le tte r (écriture) from  ‘music as an  artw orld ’ w hich th ro u g h  artistic  
p rocedures (of a certain  o p en  a n d  u n d e fin ab le  d iscip line o f  re p re ­
sentation, expression, and  acting) takes over the voices o f a re lig ion  as 
a world of existence (Daisetz T eitaro  Suzuki),
(b) politics as world of existential and  behavioral beliefs (David T h o re a u ) , 
and
(c) philosophy as a world o f procedures in language (Ludwig W ittgenstein). 
But w ha t does ap p ro p ria tin g  the  VOICES o f  re lig io n , po litics an d
philosophy signify? This is ne ith e r the p o stm odern  citation  (an  arb itrarily  
app ropria ted  and quo ted  voice o f the  O th er, taken from  the  archive o r a 
labyrinth o f  textual hypotheses), n o r  a m o d ern is t exp lica tion  o f  slogans 
(statem ents, beliefs o r discursive verification o f an  act). It is instead  an  act 
o r action perform ed within a text, an  analogy o f a perform ative act o r  speech 
act. It is th e re fo re  possible to speak, in  th e  case o f  C ag e’s texts ( le t te r /  
écriture/) o r lecture (speech), o f ‘theory  at w ork’. T h e  m ean in g  o f  a ce rta in  
text, o f the  »Lecture on  N othing« (1959),32 fo r ex am p le , is n e i th e r  th e  
m ean ing  o f a text as a closed system o f  consisten t m ean ings, n o r  closed  
m eaning o f a text which establishes arbitrary o r necessary relations with o th er 
texts of art, culture, or theory. It is a m ean ing  o f the words th a t gain th e ir 
m eaning  by the perfo rm ing  act (of w riting down, speaking  out, o f m entally  
represen ting , semantically, syntactically, o r o f typographically advocating in 
writing o r in re ad in g ).
The Entryway Between Philosophy and Literature
In Jacques D errida’s writings there  is n o  equivalence betw een lite ra tu re  
and  philosophy, betw een w riting in lite ra tu re  an d  w riting  in philosophy. 
Instead, th ere  is an open  and  postponed  prom ise: the  prom ise o f  a ‘c lo se’ 
(intim ate) re lation betw een lite ratu re an d  philosophy, o r the  p rom ise o f 
crossing the entryway which separates ph ilosophy an d  lite ratu re .
W hat is philosophy if n o t thinking? T h e  answer cou ld  be, for exam ple: 
philosophy is writing. But w here is the ‘so u rce’ o f writing, an d  w hat does 
writing dem onstrate? To whom  or to w hat does the w riting show itself: to 
the thinking, the spirit, the o th er text - to the very w riting - o r to the  essence 
o f writing, th e  essence o f philosophy? H eidegger m ig h t have said: »We ask 
about the essence o f art.« If we re tu rn  from  H eidegger to D errida, the answer
32John Cage, »Lecture on Nothing«, in jo h n  Cage, Silence, pp. 109-127.
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is posited  as a ‘flow o f qu estio n s’: »What is literature? A nd first o f all, what 
is it ‘to w rite?’ H ow is it th a t the fact o f writing can disturb the very question 
‘w hat is?’ and  even ‘w hat does it m ean?’ To say this in o th er words, (...) when 
an d  how  does an  in scrip tion  becom e literature  and w hat takes place when 
it does? T o w hat and  w hom  is this due? W hat takes place between philosophy 
an d  lite ra tu re , science an d  lite ratu re , politics an d  literature, theology and  
literature, psychoanalysis and  literature? T he question was doubtless inspired 
in m e by a desire  w hich was re la ted  also to a certain  uneasiness: why finally 
does the  inscrip tion  so fascinate m e, preoccupy me, p recede me? Why am
I so fascinated  by the  literary  use o f the inscription?«33 T he questions are 
n o tju s t  ab o u t the ‘in scrip tio n ’, they are the inscription ‘perfo rm ed ’ in such 
a way th a t it is n o t possible to separate clearly the inscrip tion (writing) o f 
lite ra tu re  from  the  inscrip tion  (writing) o f philosophy. W hat is at stake is 
n o t  the  d iach ro n ic  play o f  questions an d  answers ab o u t the prim acy o f 
li te ra tu re  o r p h ilo sophy , o r w h e th e r lite ra tu re  becom es philosophy, o r 
w h e th e r  p h ilo so p h y  by its le t te r  (écriture) crosses th e  entryw ay o f  the  
inscription o f literature. T he production o f inscription is the question at stake 
h ere , w hich causes the com plex  na tu re  o f  the d ifferentiation betw een the 
‘sou rces’ an d  ‘ou tfa ll’ o f  the inscription or leaving the trace (of writing). 
N o, this is n o t the epochal tu rn  of philosophy in  pre-philosophical o r  post- 
ph ilosophical writing o f prose, poetry or essay. It is the ‘unstable inscrip tion’ 
a t the  entryway betw een philosophy and  literature.
Conclusion
W h at d o  these  exam ples, an d  th e re  cou ld  have b een  m any m ore, 
d em onstra te?  A critical an d  suicidal re lation between a rt and  philosophy 
o r, on  the  contrary , an  ecstatic and  eclectic richness o f  the ‘pleasure in the 
sen se s’ (jouissance) o f  th e  possib ility  o f  advocating  a r t  an d  advocating  
p h ilo so p h y , o r  a n o m a d ic  d isp la c e m e n t from  ‘o n e  possib le  w orld  o f  
advocating’ in to  ‘a possible w orld ’? At a time when n o th in g  is self-evident 
w hen it com es to a rt an d  to philosophy, som e o f the relevant questions are:
-  How to define  an d  describe openness, the specific na tu re  o f examples, 
an d  eclecticism  o r nom adism  so that we acquire a systematic view o f art 
an d  philosophy?34
33 Jacques D errida, quoted  in David Carroll, Paraesthetics. Foucault Lyotard Derrida (New 
York: M ethuen, 1987), p. 83.
34 H einz Paetzold, »How to Bridge the Gap between Philosophy o f Art and Aesthetics o f 
N ature. A Systematic Approach«, Anthropos, no. 3-4, Ljubljana, 1996.
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-  How to show tha t ou r ‘baselessness an d  hom elessness’35 are  a ‘n o rm a l’ 
hum an  condition? It is n o t ju s t now th a t it becam e ev iden t th a t n o th in g  
which has to do with art is evident by itself, even its rig h t to ex istence.30 
N oth ing  that has to do with a rt o r ph ilosophy was ever ev iden t by itself.
-  How to be an ‘advocate’ in relation to a signifier which advocates a  subject 
for an o th e r signifier, o r for all o th e r signifiers?
-  How is it possible HERE an d  N O W  to destroy  w ith o n e ’s m o rta l an d  
vulnerable body the ‘advocating’ o r ‘m ed ia tin g ’ screen  o f the  signifieds37 
which separates art and philosophy, and  then  to face o n e ’s own experience 
o f the destruction  o f that break?
35 Martin Heidegger, »The Origin o f  the W ork o f  Art«, p. 149.
36 Theodor W. Adorno, Estetička teorija (Ästhetische Theorie) (Beograd: Nolit, 1979), p. 25.
37 Roland Barthes, »Rasch«, The Responsibility of Forms (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1991), p. 308.
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